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PANEL III: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW/
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
SOLVING THE PUZZLE OF MEAD AND




One area in which I teach and have become increasingly interested over
the last few years is administrative law. Although one might expect at a
symposium honoring the jurisprudence of Justice Stevens that I might focus
solely on his most famous administrative law opinion, Chevron v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.,1 and its two-step test that requires a court
to defer to a reasonable agency interpretation if the statute is ambiguous, I
have instead decided to take on the United States Supreme Court's more
recent consideration of what to do with those actions agencies take that,
unlike the bubble rule2 at issue in Chevron, likely do not go through any
required Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") process and lack the "force
of law." The deference owed to these agency guidance documents,
interpretive rules, and other more informal actions was the subject of
Christensen v. Harris County3 and then more fully explored in United
States v. Mead Corp.4 This area is of particular interest to me (1) because it
causes my students more anxiety than any other area of administrative law
(which is saying something since administrative law was never considered
an easy field before the additional wrinkle of Christensen and Mead came
along), and (2) because it is an area that I think is calling out for Justice
* Associate Professor of Law, Wallace Stegner Center for Land, Resources and the
Environment, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law; Law Clerk to Justice John
Paul Stevens, October Term 2002. I'd like to thank Fordham University School of Law and
Abner Greene for organizing and hosting an outstanding conference; Kathryn Watts, Judy
Stinson, Daniel Medwed, Alexander Skibine, Kenneth Manaster, and the rest of my fellow
panelists for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper; Cara Baldwin for her
research assistance; and, most importantly, Justice Stevens for continuing to teach and
inspire all of us.
1. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2. Id. at 840-41 (citing 46 Fed. Reg. 50,766 (Oct. 14, 1981)).
3. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
4. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
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Stevens's unique blend of theory and pragmatism, the sort that was on
display in that famous Chevron case.
I first focus on Christensen and Mead and provide an explanation of what
the Court held in those cases. Next, I provide a brief summary of what the
lower courts have done in the wake of these cases as they have tried to
apply the Court's instructions. Finally, I propose a new approach that
builds on Justice Stevens's original two-step test of the Chevron case but
adds new steps aimed at resolving the current confusion, including better
directions regarding when Chevron applies as well as a slightly modified
test for Skidmore deference. My guess is that the Justice would probably
agree with the slight modifications I have made to the Court's Mead
holding. Even more importantly, however, I think that he would, as I have
attempted to do, provide clearer directions for the lower courts to follow.
I. ONE AND A HALF PILLARS: CHRISTENSEN AND MEAD
Ultimately, both Christensen and Mead address two fundamental
questions: (1) When does Chevron apply?; and (2) If Chevron does not
apply, what, if any, deference ought to be afforded to an agency's
determination or interpretation? As I explain below, the first case,
Christensen, says little with respect to either question but began the debate
that I take up here. I therefore refer to it as the half pillar. Mead, in turn,
more fully explores both questions. Accordingly, Mead is the full pillar in
this structure.
A. Christensen
In the first of these cases, Christensen, the Court was asked to resolve the
question of whether, under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"),5 a state
or its political subdivisions could compel its employees to use their
compensatory or "comp" time. 6 Here's how the question arose: The statute
provides that employees who work more than forty hours in a week are
entitled to compensation for the additional hours at a rate of no less than
one and a half times their regular hourly wage. 7 When the Court concluded
in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority8 that states and
their subdivisions were subject to the requirements of FLSA, states and
Congress alike became concerned that the statute would overwhelm
government budgets.9 The statute was therefore amended to give states and
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000).
6. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 578.
7. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).
8. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
9. See generally Moreau v. Klevenhagen, 508 U.S. 22, 26 (1993) ("The projected
'financial costs of coming into compliance with the FLSA-particularly the overtime
provisions'-were specifically identified as a matter of grave concern to many States and
localities." (quoting S. Rep. No. 99-159, at 8 (1985))).
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their political subdivisions the ability to compensate employees with
"comp" time rather than cash for their overtime. 10
But FLSA also limits the number of comp time hours that an employee
may accrue to 480 hours for an employee who works "in a public safety
activity, an emergency response activity, or a seasonal activity"'l l and to
240 hours for those employees engaged in other types of work. 12 If an
employee who has accumulated the maximum comp time hours works
additional overtime hours, she must be compensated for that time in cash. 13
Moreover, an employee who is terminated is entitled under FLSA to cash
compensation for any comp time that she has remaining at the time of
termination. 14
In the early 1990s, officials in Harris County, Texas, "became concerned
that [the county] lacked the resources to pay monetary compensation to
employees who worked overtime after reaching the statutory cap on
compensatory time accrual and to employees who left their jobs with
sizable reserves of accrued time." 15 They therefore asked the Department
of Labor, the agency charged with administering FLSA, 16 whether the
county could require its employees to use their comp time.' 7  The
Department responded that unless the employer and its employees had a
prior agreement that permitted the employer to require its employees to use
their comp time, it was the Department's position that the employer could
not do so. 18
Although Harris County did not claim to have such an agreement with its
employees, it nevertheless instituted a policy requiring its employees to use
their comp time, contrary to the recommendation in the Department's
letter.19 Shortly after this policy was instituted, members of the Harris
County Sheriffs Department objected to the policy and then sued the
county, asserting, among other things, that the compelled use of their comp
10. 29 U.S.C. § 207(o)(1).
11. Id. § 207(o)(3)(A).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. § 207(o)(4).
15. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 580 (2000).
16. See Pub. L. No. 99-150, § 6, 99 Stat. 79, reprinted in 29 U.S.C. § 203 note (2000)
(directing the Secretary of Labor to "promulgate such regulations as may be required to
implement [the] amendments" regarding comp time).
17. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 580.
18. See Opinion Letter from Wage & Hour Div., Dep't of Labor (Sept. 14, 1992), 1992
WL 845100.
19. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 581.
After receiving the letter, Harris County implemented a policy under which the
employees' supervisor sets a maximum number of compensatory hours that may
be accumulated. When an employee's stock of hours approaches that maximum,
the employee is advised of the maximum and is asked to take steps to reduce
accumulated compensatory time. If the employee does not do so voluntarily, a
supervisor may order the employee to use his compensatory time at specified
times.
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time violated § 207 of FLSA, the section on comp time, and the regulations
that implement that section.20
Justice Thomas wrote the opinion for the majority and began the analysis
by looking at the statute in question. He concluded for the Court that FLSA
"says nothing about restricting an employer's efforts to require employees
to use compensatory time" and therefore cannot be read to prohibit an
employer from requiring an employee to use her comp time.21 The opinion
then turned to the question of deference to the agency's position as
announced in the opinion letter. First, it pointed out that, unlike
interpretations arrived at after notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal
adjudication, opinion letters and things like them such as "interpretations
contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement
guidelines, all of which lack the force of law[,] do not warrant Chevron-
style deference." 22  But not only did the letter not warrant Chevron
deference according to the majority, it warranted no deference whatsoever:
[I]nterpretations contained in formats such as opinion letters are 'entitled
to respect' under our decision in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134,
140 (1944), but only to the extent that those interpretations have the
'power to persuade,' ibid. As explained above, we find unpersuasive the
agency's interpretation of the statute at issue in this case. 23
Justice Scalia concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. His
principal disagreement with the majority involved the use of Skidmore
deference, which he viewed as an "anachronism" after the Court's decision
in Chevron.24 In Justice Scalia's view, the Court should engage in the
Chevron analysis when it is called on to determine the deference to be
accorded to "authoritative agency positions 25 regardless of what form
those positions take. Justice Scalia viewed the position espoused in the
Department's opinion letter as the kind of authoritative position that might
be entitled to Chevron deference. 26 But this was not the end of the matter:
In Justice Scalia's view, the Department's position failed at step two of
Chevron,27 that is, Justice Scalia would not defer to the agency's position
under Chevron because it was not a permissible or reasonable construction
of the statute.28
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, dissented in the
case, and wrote at length regarding what he viewed as the majority's errors
in resolving the statutory interpretation question. Although Justice
20. Brief of Petitioner at 18, Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000) (No. 98-
1167).
21. See Christensen, 529 U.S. at 582-86.
22. Id. at 587.
23. Id. (citation omitted).
24. Id. at 589-90 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
25. Id. at 590.
26. Id. at 591.
27. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984).
28. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 591.
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Stevens's take on this question is interesting and persuasive, for the
purposes of the administrative law issue in the case-in particular the
question of affording Skidmore deference-the very end of Justice
Stevens's opinion merits close attention.
After his statutory analysis, Justice Stevens states that "it is not without
significance in the present case that the Government department responsible
for the statute's enforcement shares my understanding of its meaning."
29
He then explains why the Department's position is reasonable, and, after
citing Skidmore, states that "[b]ecause there is no reason to believe that the
Department's opinion was anything but thoroughly considered and
consistently observed, it unquestionably merits our respect. '30
There are two important points to make at this juncture. First, the
majority opinion said nothing of the agency's consideration or consistent
observation of its position although both factors are included in Skidmore's
list of factors to consider when determining the weight to be given to an
agency position of this sort: "the thoroughness evident in its consideration,
the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if
lacking power to control."'3 1 Second, Justice Stevens phrases the deference
to be accorded here as "merit[ing] our respect. '32 I will return to this
wording later, and will consider then whether it is a better way to articulate
the amount of deference to be afforded under Skidmore.
Finally, Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, separately dissented
in Christensen to disagree with Justice Scalia that Skidmore was "an
anachronism." 33 In Justice Breyer's view, if an agency had been delegated
the legal authority to make a determination, the agency's determination
should be accorded Chevron deference. 3 4 But "where one has doubt that
Congress actually intended to delegate interpretive authority to the
agency," 35 Skidmore should be used to determine the weight to be accorded
to the agency's position.36 It is important to note that Justice Breyer makes
no mention of the form of the agency's determination-be it in an opinion
letter, a notice-and-comment rulemaking, or the result of a formal
adjudication-and concedes that Justice Scalia "may well be right" 37 that
the agency position in Christensen might be an authoritative agency view
entitled to Chevron deference.
29. Id. at 594 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 595; see also discussion infra Part II.B.2.
31. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
32. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 595 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 596 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 597.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 596.
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The question of the legal authority delegated by Congress to an agency
or, in Justice Thomas's terms, what agency determinations have "the force
of law," 38 leads us to Mead.
B. The Prelude to Mead
Shortly after Christensen was decided-in fact, in the same month that
Christensen was decided-the Court granted certiorari in United States v.
Mead Corp.39 This was fortunate since the lower courts began to struggle
with Christensen soon after it was issued.
For example, in Gonzalez v. Reno,40 the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit was asked to reexamine its prior decision in the case41 in
light of Christensen. In particular, the court had to reach an issue that
appeared to have been left open by the Christensen opinion: Does an
informal adjudication by the Immigration and Naturalization Service
("INS") fall within the scope of Christensen? Although Christensen
indicated that formal adjudications were entitled to Chevron deference, the
court of appeals concluded that the Court's list was "not to be an exhaustive
or complete list of agency acts due deference" 42 and that the INS's position
in this circumstance was "final and binding"43---or had the force of law-
which entitled it to Chevron deference.
What makes this case somewhat puzzling is that the Eleventh Circuit's
earlier opinion that did not reference Christensen seemed to indicate that
some lesser Chevron deference was due in this situation, sounding, it turns
out, quite a bit like Christensen and the sliding scale of Skidmore in the
process:
The INS policy toward Plaintiffs application was not created by NS
lawyers during litigation, but instead was developed in the course of
administrative proceedings before litigation commenced. While the
policy announced by the INS may not harmonize perfectly with earlier
INS interpretative guidelines (which are not law), the parties have cited,
and we have found, no statutory provision, no regulatory authority, and no
prior agency adjudication that "flatly contradicts" the policy. That the
38. Id. at 587 (majority opinion).
39. United States v. Mead Corp., 530 U.S. 1202 (2000) (granting certiorari).
40. 215 F.3d 1243, 1245-46 (1 1th Cir. 2000) (denying rehearing and rehearing en banc
but clarifying prior opinion). It is worth noting that this case involved Elian Gonzalez, a six-
year-old Cuban boy who had arrived in the United States after he and his mother escaped
from Cuba. Elian's mother died at sea but Elian was rescued. While his relatives in the
United States sought to have Elian remain in the United States, his father in Cuba demanded
Elian's return. Elian's case became the focus of intense media scrutiny and popular debate.
See, e.g., David Gonzalez & Lizette Alvarez, Havana Welcome: Father Takes Son Home
After Appeal by Kin in Miami is Denied, N.Y. Times, June 29, 2000, at Al ("Hours after the
United States Supreme Court declined to hear arguments in the Elian Gonzalez case, the 6-
year-old left behind seven months of contention, conflict and court battles, and returned
home to Cuba tonight with his father.").
41. Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338 (1 1th Cir. 2000).
42. Gonzalez, 215 F.3d at 1245 n.3.
43. Id. at 1245.
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INS policy was developed in the course of an informal adjudication,
rather than during formal rulemaking, may affect the degree of deference
appropriate but does not render the policy altogether unworthy of
deference. And that the INS policy may not be a longstanding one
likewise affects only the degree of deference required. The INS policy,
therefore, is entitled to, at least, some deference under Chevron; and that
deference, when we take account of the implications of the policy for
foreign affairs, becomes considerable. 44
Accordingly, in addition to resolving what deference, if any, was owed to
determinations resulting from informal adjudications, the Court needed to
address whether there existed a "some" or lesser Chevron deference
category. Fortunately, the Court appeared to have its vehicle for resolving
those questions in Mead.
C. Mead
The central issue in Mead was what, if any, deference was owed to a
United States Customs Service's tariff classification.4 5  The Mead
Corporation imported day planners, which are three-ring binders that
provide writing space for each calendar day so that one can take notes and
keep a schedule.46 The planners also have a space for phone numbers and
addresses. 47 At the time when the dispute arose, day planners fell into one
of two subcategories under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United
States:48  If day planners fell into the first subcategory-"[d]iaries,
notebooks, and address books bound; memorandum pads, letter pads, and
other similar articles"49-Mead would be required to pay a four percent
tariff. If day planners were considered "other items," Mead would pay no
tariff.50
For several years, day planners were treated under the "other" category
and Mead paid no tariff on them. 51 In 1993, the Customs Service changed
course and put the day planners in the "diaries" category. 52 This, of course,
meant that Mead was required to pay a tariff, a prospect Mead was none too
pleased about.
When Mead challenged its switch in position, the Customs Service
responded with a "carefully reasoned but never published"5 3 letter
indicating why it had decided to change the classification of the day
44. Gonzalez, 212 F.3d at 1350-51 (footnotes and citations omitted).
45. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001).
46. Id. at 224.
47. Id.
48. 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (2000).
49. Mead, 533 U.S. at 224 (quoting Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States
subheading 4820.10.20).
50. Id. at 225 (quoting Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States subheading
4820.10.40).
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planners. 54 When the Customs Service rejected Mead's subsequent protest
against the new ruling and new letter, Mead filed suit in the Court of
International Trade.55 In that court, the Customs Service was granted
summary judgment without any discussion of deference. 56 On appeal to the
Federal Circuit, the question was whether Chevron deference or no
deference was owed,57 particularly in light of the Court's then recent
opinion in United States v. Haagar Apparel Co.,58 in which the Court
concluded that Customs Service regulations were entitled to Chevron
deference. 59 It appears that the issue of Skidmore deference or some other
intermediate type of deference was not raised in the lower courts.
In the Supreme Court, the issue of Skidmore deference versus Chevron
deference was front and center. In the end, Justice Souter wrote the
majority opinion joined by, among others, Justice Stevens. 60 Justice Scalia
dissented. 6 1
Justice Souter began the analysis by delineating those instances in which
Chevron deference will apply. Chevron deference is appropriate "when it
appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make
rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming
deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority. '62 There are a
"variety of ways," 63 according to the majority, for Congress to demonstrate
its intention to delegate to an agency the authority to make rules with the
force of law, such as "by an agency's power to engage in adjudication or
notice-and-comment rulemaking, or by some other indication of a
comparable congressional intent." 64
Justice Souter later provided the following additional explanation to
determine when Chevron applies:
We have recognized a very good indicator of delegation meriting
Chevron treatment in express congressional authorizations to engage in
the process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces regulations or
rulings for which deference is claimed. It is fair to assume generally that
Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect of law when
it provides for a relatively formal administrative procedure tending to
foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement
of such force. Thus, the overwhelming number of our cases applying
Chevron deference have reviewed the fruits of notice-and-comment
rulemaking or formal adjudication. That said, and as significant as notice-
and-comment is in pointing to Chevron authority, the want of that
54. See id.
55. See Mead Corp. v. United States, 22 Ct. Int'l Trade 707 (1998).
56. See id.
57. See Mead Corp. v. United States, 185 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
58. 526 U.S. 380 (1999).
59. Id. at 394.
60. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 220-21 (2001).
61. Id. at 239.
62. Id. at 226-27.
63. Id. at 227.
64. Id.
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procedure here does not decide the case, for we have sometimes found
reasons for Chevron deference even when no such administrative
formality was required and none was afforded, see, e.g., NationsBank of
N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 256-257, 263
(1995). The fact that the tariff classification here was not a product of
such formal process does not alone, therefore, bar the application of
Chevron.65
In other words, Chevron deference is usually appropriate when an agency
is required to engage in and has undertaken a notice-and-comment
rulemaking or when it is required to employ and has afforded a formal
adjudication. One also assumes that formal rulemaking, 66 a less often used
but available option under the APA,6 7 would also qualify in this list.
Justice Souter leaves the door open for Congress to override this
presumption by providing in clear terms that, although it is requiring the
agency to engage in, for example, notice-and-comment procedures, the
rules adopted by the agency are not to have the force of law. Where there
are ambiguous rulemaking grants, however, the Court's assumption
(whether correct or not68 ) is that those grants give the agency power to act
with the force of law and therefore are afforded Chevron deference.
Justice Souter leaves us with a final caveat: There also may be instances
in which no formal process was required but that the agency action
nevertheless warrants Chevron deference. 69 This is a somewhat confusing
category 70 for which Justice Souter provides only a single example in
support: In NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance
Co.,7 1 the Court held that the Comptroller of the Currency's conclusions
with respect to the banking laws warranted Chevron deference. Given the
reliance on a solitary case, one imagines that the exception was intended as
a narrow category. That is, when Congress does not require some APA
process, i.e., informal notice-and-comment rulemaking, formal rulemaking,
or formal adjudication, Chevron deference should be afforded only where it
is clear that Congress intends the agency to have the power to make rules
with the force of law. But the opinion is less than clear as to when
65. Id. at 229-31 (citations and footnotes omitted).
66. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2000) ("When rules are required by statute to be made on the
record after an opportunity for an agency hearing, sections 556 and 557 of this title
[providing the formal procedures] apply."). See generally United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry.
Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973) (discussing when formal rulemaking is triggered).
67. 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 551-706 (West Supp. 2005).
68. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of
Law: The Original Convention, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 467, 472 (2002) (arguing that, from the
1920s until 1945 and perhaps as recently as 1967, "Congress followed a drafting convention
that signaled to agencies whether particular rulemaking grants conferred authority to make
rules with the force of law as opposed to mere housekeeping rules" but that in the 1960s, two
influential opinions construed facially ambiguous rulemaking grants, inconsistent with the
convention, as authorizing legislative rulemaking; that assumption has remained to this day).
69. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 231 (2001).
70. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and
Meta-Standards, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 807, 813-14 (2004).
71. 513 U.S. 251 (1995).
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Congress has acted in such a way as to indicate that this exception should
apply. 72
While examining the particular Customs Service ruling at issue, Justice
Souter provided additional guidance that is helpful to determine whether an
agency decision warrants Chevron deference. 73 As Professor Thomas
Merrill has persuasively argued, this portion of the opinion is probably best
read as providing three factors 74 to be considered when determining
whether a particular agency interpretation has the force of law: "(1)
whether Congress has prescribed relatively formal procedures; (2) whether
Congress has authorized the agency to adopt rules or precedents that
generalize to more than a single case; and (3) whether Congress has
authorized the agency to prescribe legal norms that apply uniformly
throughout its jurisdiction," 75 i.e., requiring like cases be treated alike. 76
None of these factors, however, appears to be either necessary or
sufficient. 77
In the Mead case, the Customs Service's ruling letter was not issued after
a required APA process. It was conclusive between the Customs Service
and the importer 78 but, Justice Souter noted, the "binding" nature of the
letter "stops short of third parties." 79 Finally, given the large volume of
rulings issued every year by a number of different Customs offices, it was
unlikely that there was uniformity in the rulings, that is, it was unlikely that
like cases were being treated alike. 80 Accordingly, the opinion concluded
that the letter was "best treated like 'interpretations contained in policy
statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines,' 8' all of which
"are beyond the Chevron pale."82
So if we are beyond Chevron's pale, should any deference whatsoever be
afforded to the agency's determination? Justice Souter answered this
question with the answer every first-year law student learns to love:
Maybe.8 3 Justice Souter explained that the classification ruling in this case
72. See Merrill, supra note 70, at 813 ("Justice Souter did not identify any triggering
condition for determining when an agency has been given the power to act with the force of
law.").
73. Mead, 533 U.S. at 231-34.
74. Professor Merrill also "readily admit[s] that the number and correct characterization
of the factors invoked in the majority opinion is open to debate" and provides the arguments
for viewing the Court's discussion as providing either four or five factors, instead of just
three. Merrill, supra note 70, at 814 & n.41.
75. Id. at 814.
76. See id. at 817.
77. Seeid. at 815-17.
78. Mead, 533 U.S. at 233 (citing 19 C.F.R. § 177.9(c) (2000)).
79. Id.
80. See id. at 233-34; Merrill, supra note 70, at 817.
81. Mead, 533 U.S. at 234 (quoting Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587
(2000)).
82. Id.
83. Id. There is an excellent book intended to make this point to first-year law students.
See Richard Michael Fischl & Jeremy Paul, Getting to Maybe: How to Excel on Law
School Exams (1999).
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might deserve Skidmore deference but that deference-not just whether
deference is appropriate but the very amount of deference-will depend
again on a variety of factors.8 4 More specifically, instead of the clear
deference standard of Chevron--"if the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute" 85-
Skidmore deference is on a sliding scale "from great respect on one end...
to near indifference at the other." 86 Courts are to determine at which end an
agency's determination falls, Skidmore instructs, by looking to "the
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors
which give it power to persuade, if lacking the power to control."' 87 After
reciting this standard, the Court remanded the case for an assessment under
Skidmore as to whether the Customs Service ruling was owed any
deference. 88
Justice Scalia dissented in a lengthy opinion. 89 With respect to both
questions-determining when Chevron applies and identifying the contours
of Skidmore deference-Justice Scalia roundly criticized the majority.
On the first question, Justice Scalia asserted that the majority's test for
determining when Chevron applies was bound to confuse. Rather than
employ the majority's "grab bag"90 of factors, Justice Scalia would afford
Chevron deference when the agency's position is "authoritative," 91 that is,
when the agency's determination represents the "official position of the
agency." 92  Like the majority's test for when Chevron applies, Justice
Scalia's test considers several factors such as
(1) whether the interpretation has been endorsed at the "highest levels" in
the agency as opposed to by "some underlings;" (2) whether the general
counsel has defended the interpretation in court; (3) whether the
interpretation has been supported by a brief filed by the Solicitor General;
and (4) whether the interpretation is more than a "'post hoc
84. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 235; see also id. at 228 (discussing the factors to consider
when determining the weight to give to an agency determination under Skidmore).
85. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
86. Mead, 533 U.S. at 228 (footnotes omitted).
87. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). Justice Souter provides a
similar but slightly different articulation of this principle at the outset of his opinion: "The
fair measure of deference to an agency administering its own statute has been understood to
vary with circumstances, and courts have looked to the degree of the agency's care, its
consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the agency's
position." Mead, 533 U.S. at 228.
88. Mead, 533 U.S. at 238-39. On remand, the Federal Circuit concluded that the
Customs letter lacked the power to persuade under Skidmore and thus the day planners fell
under the "other" category, which meant that Mead would be not be charged a tariff. Mead
Corp. v. United States, 283 F.3d 1342, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
89. Mead, 533 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 245.
91. Id. at 257.
92. Id.
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rationalizatio[n]"' or a legal position developed by the agency in
litigation. 93
Although Justice Scalia readily admits that his is not a bright-line test, it is,
in his view, "infinitely brighter than the line the Court asks us to draw
today." 94
As to the second question, Justice Scalia derides the majority for its
resurrection of Skidmore altogether. Most troubling to Justice Scalia is that,
when Skidmore applies, the clear standard of deference found in Chevron is
replaced with "th'ol' 'totality of the circumstances' test."95
Based on these two overarching concerns, Justice Scalia provides a list of
what he believes will be the four negative "practical effects" 96 of the
majority's new rule: (1) protracted confusion in the lower courts as to what
gets Chevron deference as opposed to what gets Skidmore deference,
determined, as discussed above, by what Justice Scalia calls a "grab bag" 97
of factors; 98 (2) "an artificially induced increase in informal rulemaking"
because it is a safe harbor; that is, it will get Chevron deference; 99 (3)
"ossification of large portions of our statutory law"' 00 because where the
agency's decision is subject only to Skidmore deference, the court
interpretation of the statute is final and cannot be changed by the agency,
either through notice-and-comment procedures or otherwise 01 (this can be
contrasted with Chevron, which allows an agency to change its mind so
long as the interpretation remains within the scope of the ambiguity' 0 2); and
(4) "uncertainty, unpredictability, and endless litigation"'1 3 because of the
indeterminate nature of Skidmore deference.
The question is, was Justice Scalia right?
II. LIFE AFTER MEAD: THE FALLOUT
A. The Difficult-to-Confirm Predictions
Two of Justice Scalia's predicted effects, an artificial increase in informal
rulemaking and an increase in litigation, are difficult to verify in the short
time frame since Mead was decided, particularly when one is mindful of the
many other variables that might contribute to both phenomena were they to
emerge. Accordingly, it is likely too early to tell whether he was correct on
93. Merrill, supra note 70, at 818 (quoting Mead, 533 U.S. at 258 & n.6 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
94. Mead, 533 U.S. at 258 n.6.
95. Id. at 241.
96. Id. at 245.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 246.
100. Id. at 247.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 247-48.
103. Id. at 250.
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either front. Moreover, were we to wait a few years for more data, it might
be difficult or perhaps even impossible to control for the other variables that
might increase either rulemaking or litigation, which would prevent one
from drawing a defensible conclusion with respect to these predictions.
Likewise, Justice Scalia's third prediction regarding ossification might
also require years before meaningful data would be available for collection
and evaluation and, just as with the other predictions, such a study would
have to control for the other variables that might be at play. We need not
worry about these difficulties, however, because last Term the Court did
away with the premise of this prediction in National Cable &
Telecommunications Ass 'n v. BrandXInternet Services. 104
1. Brand X
Brand X involved a conflict between a ruling by the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") interpreting a particular statutory
provision 10 5 and a prior decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit that had interpreted the same provision.'0 6 The Ninth Circuit,
relying on a case Justice Scalia cited in his Mead dissent, Neal v. United
States, 10 7 concluded that its prior interpretation of the statute "trumped" the
agency's later interpretation of that same statutory provision.
Reversing, Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, explained that "[a]
court's prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency
construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court
decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of
the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion."' 108 Accordingly,
if the court does not indicate that its interpretation of a statute is the only
one possible because the statute is unambiguous, "the agency may,
consistent with the court's holding, choose a different construction, since
the agency remains the authoritative interpreter (within the limits of reason)
of such statutes."' 09
As Justice Scalia conceded in dissent, the majority's holding in Brand X
solves any potential ossification effect that he had predicted as a result of
Mead. o10 But this did not, in Justice Scalia's view, come without a cost:
"The Court today moves to solve this problem of its own creation by
inventing yet another breathtaking novelty: judicial decisions subject to
reversal by Executive officers."'
104. 125 S. Ct. 2688 (2005).
105. Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities,
17 F.C.C.R. 4798 (2002).
106. AT & T, Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000).
107. 516 U.S. 284 (1996).
108. BrandX, 125 S. Ct. at 2700.
109. Id. at 2701.
110. See id. at 2719 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
111. Id.
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Interestingly, although he joined the majority opinion, in his separate
concurrence, Justice Stevens carved out an exception to the majority's rule
that would permit an agency to trump a prior judicial opinion. In his view,
applying the rule to interpretations of courts of appeals is permissible. 112
But "a decision by [the Supreme Court] ... would presumably remove any
pre-existing ambiguity"'" 3 and thus the rule permitting agency trumping
might not apply to interpretations of the Supreme Court. 14
As Justice Scalia suggests, Brand X may be "full of promise for
administrative-law professors in need of tenure articles," 115 particularly in
light of Justice Stevens's intriguing concurrence. With respect to Justice
Scalia's ossification prediction, however, there is little more to say,
although Justice Scalia may be correct that another problem has been
created. 1' 6 I will therefore turn now to Justice Scalia's last two predictions:
protracted confusion in the lower courts as to when Chevron applies and
uncertainty and unpredictability due to the indeterminate weight of
Skidmore deference.
B. The Confirmable Predictions
Justice Scalia appears to be most concerned with the first of his
predictions, the confusion that occurs when a court must determine whether
Chevron deference applies, since his criticism of this portion of the majority
opinion is especially pointed. 117 Justice Scalia's second concern, the
unpredictability of the result when Skidmore deference applies, is based on
the notion that it is unclear how that test will turn out ex ante because the
weight of deference afforded an agency's interpretation under Skidmore is
determined by a variety of factors and on a sliding scale. I will begin with
the first of Justice Scalia's concerns. 1 18
1. When Does Chevron Apply?
Before analyzing any cases from the lower courts, I briefly note that
Justice Breyer and Justice Scalia took up the debate regarding when
Chevron applies again in BrandX. Justice Scalia continued to criticize the
Court's approach in determining when an agency position would get
112. See id. at 2712 (Stevens, J., concurring).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 2721 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
116. See, e.g., Kathryn A. Watts, Reassessing the Allocation of Interpretational Authority
Between the Courts and Agencies After BrandX A Call for an Interactive Model (Dec. 12,
2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (proposing an interactive approach to
statutory interpretation post-BrandX).
117. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 240-41, 243-46 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
118. Id at 250; see also id. at 247 ("Skidmore deference gives the agency's current
position some vague and uncertain amount of respect .... ").
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Chevron deference, noting that much of the Court's test remained
"unspecified.""l 9
Justice Breyer, on the other hand, reiterated that a required APA process
is "neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for according Chevron
deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute." 120 His explanation as
to why it is an unnecessary condition is, as one would expect, because "an
agency might arrive at an authoritative interpretation of a congressional
enactment in other ways" 121 such as in NationsBank.
Justice Breyer's explanation for why following a required APA process
is not sufficient to afford Chevron deference, however, is more puzzling.
Justice Breyer claims that Congress may not have intended an agency
pronunciation that has gone through a required APA process to have the
force of law "where an unusually basic legal question is at issue." 122
Justice Breyer does not explain what an "unusually basic legal question" is
and thus the potential candidates for this category remain unclear. Indeed,
the creation of yet another additional "mushy" category does not add any
clarity or substance to the analysis but instead would seem to make this
exercise exponentially more difficult. In my view, it is more plausible that
following a required APA process would not be sufficient to garner
Chevron deference either because Congress made clear it did not intend for
the agency to act with the force of law by employing specific language to
that effect (indicating that the agency's action is "without the force of law"
or by providing that the agency's determination is "advisory" and
"nonbinding") or because Congress provided an implicit but obvious clue
as suggested by Professors Merrill and Kathryn Watts such as where
Congress has not "included a provision in the statute that prescribes
sanctions or other legal consequences for violations of agency action." 123
Turning, however, to whether the lower courts have in fact been confused
on this front, we should begin with Professor Adrian Vermeule's analysis of
three opinions from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit issued shortly after the decision in Mead.124 Those three
cases are Federal Election Commission ("FEC") v. National Rifle Ass 'n of
America ("NRA ,),125 Motion Picture Ass 'n of America, Inc. v. FCC,126 and
Michigan v. EPA.127 With respect to two of the three, Professor Vermeule
explains that in both Motion Picture Ass'n v. FCC-which involved an
FCC notice-and-comment rulemaking 2 8 to which the panel afforded no
119. BrandX, 125 S. Ct. at 2718, 2719 & n.9 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 2712 (Breyer, J., concurring).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 2713.
123. Merrill, supra note 70, at 828; see also Merrill & Watts, supra note 68, at 582-83.
124. Adrian Vermeule, Introduction: Mead in the Trenches, 71 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 347
(2003).
125. 254 F.3d 173 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
126. 309 F.3d 796 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
127. 268 F.3d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
128. Motion Picture Ass'n, 309 F.3d at 800.
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deference because the panel concluded that the FCC had not been delegated
the authority to make such a rule under the statutory section it had relied
on' 29-and Michigan v. EPA-which, like the Motion Picture case,
involved a notice-and-comment rulemaking 130 that the panel refused to
defer to because it concluded that the statute did not authorize the rules 131 -
the court's Mead analysis was simply wrong. 132 Moreover, while Professor
Vermeule does not contend that the analysis in FEC v. NRA is incorrect, he
argues that the panel wasted its time analyzing whether Chevron or
Skidmore applied:
[R]esolving that uncertainty produces highly inefficient meta-litigation
that precedes and in some respects hampers, rather than contributes to, the
resolution of cases.
The costs of the elaborate predecision required by Mead will be
highest whenever the difference between Chevron deference and
Skidmore deference will make no difference to the resolution of the
ultimate statutory question. 133
In the end, Professor Vermeule concludes that "the D.C. Circuit's day-to-
day experience with Mead has been unfortunate, [and] that its Mead-related
work product is, in a nontrivial number of cases, flawed or incoherent."1 34
In baseball terms, the D.C. Circuit was batting .333-not a bad batting
average, but a failing grade in most academic exercises and certainly well
below what we would expect from a federal court of appeals. Moreover,
even in the single case where the court arguably got the analysis "right," it
came at what Professor Vermeule viewed as an excessive cost because, in
the end, the difference in the degree of deference afforded made no
difference in result and therefore did not justify the amount of time the
court was required to expend deciding the issue. 135
The cases from the federal courts of appeals in the four years since Mead
indicate that the courts remain somewhat confused on this question but
perhaps less so than the D.C. Circuit appeared to have been in the three
early cases examined by Professor Vermeule.136 In particular, courts seem
to have less trouble with the analysis when the agency decision was made in
the course of a required APA process, but this is likely the result of
considering such process sufficient despite the Court's explicit instructions
not to do so. That is, most courts appear to collapse the analysis into a
129. See id. at 801.
130. Michigan v. EPA, 268 F.3d at 1080-81.
131. See id, at 1082.
132. Vermeule, supra note 124, at 351-52, 355.
133. Id. at 350.
134. Id. at 347.
135. See id. at 351, 357.
136. It is useful to note that no other circuit seems to be as enamored (or what others
might refer to as distracted) by the nondelegation doctrine as the D.C. Circuit and it may be,
as Professor Adrian Vermeule notes, that the injection of the nondelegation doctrine into the
Mead analysis is at the core of why the D.C. Circuit appears to lose its way in the early
cases. See id. at 352-55.
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single inquiry: If the APA-required process was followed, Chevron
deference is warranted.
This is not to say that any of these cases were wrongly decided. Indeed,
the Court itself suggested in Mead that "a very good indicator of delegation
meriting Chevron treatment [is found] in express congressional
authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication that
produces regulations or rulings for which deference is claimed."' 137 But
while these cases may not be "wrong," they nevertheless illustrate the
pervasive "shortcutting" of the Mead analysis.
For example, in New York Public Interest Research Group v.
Whitman,' 38 when the Second Circuit was presented with an interpretation
promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") after notice-
and-comment procedures, it determined Chevron deference was appropriate
after declaring in a single sentence that "[s]ince there is no question that the
EPA's interpretation was promulgated in the exercise of rulemaking
authority delegated to it by Congress, Mead is satisfied."'139 Likewise, in
BCCA Appeal Group v. United States EPA,140 the Fifth Circuit appeared to
overemphasize the role of process in the analysis, which is most evident in
its conclusion: "Because notice-and-comment rulemaking is a formal
process, EPA's final rules approving the Houston [State Implementation
Plan], to the extent they involve the reasonable resolution of ambiguities in
the [Clean Air Act], will be afforded Chevron deference."'14 1 Similarly, in
Perez-Olivo v. Chavez,142 the First Circuit stated that "the [Bureau of
Prisons'] interpretation of the statute. . . is embodied in 28 C.F.R. § 523.20,
which was adopted pursuant to the notice-and-comment procedure of the
Administrative Procedure Act . . . . [and therefore] is entitled to full
deference under Chevron. 14 3
137. United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
138. 321 F.3d 316 (2d Cir. 2003).
139. Id. at 329. The court cited a D.C. Circuit case, Sierra Club v. EPA, 294 F.3d 155
(D.C. Cir. 2002), in support of its conclusion. In Sierra Club, the D.C. Circuit did not
mention Mead, let alone engage in any analysis regarding what level of deference was owed;
it simply stated, "We review the EPA's interpretation of the Clean Air Act under the
standards set out in Chevron." Id. at 160. One might argue that there was no need to engage
in such an analysis since Chevron itself involved the Clean Air Act just as these cases did.
This may be true, but if so, one would expect the courts to cite the passage in Mead
indicating just that: "Chevron itself is a good example showing when Chevron deference is
warranted." Mead, 533 U.S. at 237 n.18.
140. 355 F.3d 817 (5th Cir. 2003).
141. Id. at 825. Again, because this case also involved the Clean Air Act, one would
assume that the Fifth Circuit could have cited to footnote 18 in Mead rather than engage in
the analysis under Mead.
142. 394 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2005).
143. Id. at 52 n.6; see also Ind. Family & Soc. Servs. Admin. v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 476,
480 (7th Cir. 2002) ("Mead... makes clear that not all agency interpretations of its own
laws are entitled to full Chevron deference. Only those subject to notice-and-comment or
comparable formalities qualify."); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise § 3.5,
at 13 (4th ed. Supp. 2005) ("[L]egislative rules and formal adjudications are always entitled
to Chevron deference, while less formal pronouncements like interpretative rules and
informal adjudications may or may not be entitled to Chevron deference.").
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An interesting exception to the cases that overemphasize required APA
procedures is the Ninth Circuit's decision in Hall v. United States EPA.144
In that case, the court concluded that rules that had gone through required
notice-and-comment procedures were not entitled to Chevron deference
because the rules indicated that they were nonprecedential, i.e., that they
would not apply to others outside of the original ruling. 145 Here, then,
instead of overemphasizing the formality of procedures, this court seems to
have focused solely on the single factor of precedential effect. In sum, all
of these cases illustrate the courts' preference to turn the test into one that
considers a single factor determinative rather than evaluating the three
factors provided in Mead and then reaching a resolution. 146
Determinations that are made without APA-required process also seem to
fall prey to a similar problem. In these cases, although the courts may again
get it "right," they tend to overemphasize the process and downplay (if
mention at all) the factors of general applicability and uniformity. For
example, in Chao v. Russell P. Le Frois Builder, Inc.,147 the court
concluded that because the agency view was a litigation position, "[t]his is
not a case, then, in which we owe deference to 'the fruits of notice-and-
comment rulemaking or formal adjudication."' 148 The court then noted that
the agency also presented no reason to follow the ruling in NationsBank. 149
Although this single sentence could have served as a proxy for the other
two Mead factors, the court never explicitly considered them as Mead
seems to require.
The emphasis on process is likewise clear in Matz v. Household
International Tax Reduction Investment Plan. 150 In that case, the court held
that
[a]lthough the Supreme Court indicated in Mead that Chevron deference
may apply to interpretations developed from less formal rulemaking
procedures, it did not expressly outline when this would be the case. The
IRS'[s] position in the amicus brief was not bom from a formal
policymaking procedure. We do not believe that a position set forth in an
amicus brief, supported by some Revenue Rulings and an agency manual
are formal enough to warrant Chevron treatment. 151
144. 273 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2001).
145. Seeid. at 1155-56.
146. Cf Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 416 F.3d 184, 190 (2d Cir. 2005) (refusing to afford
Chevron deference to an immigration judge's rulings largely on the basis of the lack of
binding effect beyond the parties without discussion of the formality of the procedures
involved).
147. 291 F.3d 219 (2d Cir. 2002).
148. Id. at 227 (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001)).
149. Id.
150. 265 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001).
151. Id. at 575; see also Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr. v. Thompson, 380 F.3d 142, 155 (3d
Cir. 2004) ("'To grant Chevron deference to informal agency interpretations would unduly
validate the results of an informal process."' (quoting Madison v. Res. for Human Dev., Inc.,
233 F.3d 175, 186 (3d Cir. 2000))); U.S. Dep't of Labor v. N.C. Growers Ass'n, Inc., 377
F.3d 345, 353 (4th Cir. 2004) ("The [Department of Labor's] interpretative bulletins,
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The Supreme Court itself may, like the lower courts, have shortcut the
analysis on occasion. In Wisconsin Department of Health & Family
Services v. Blumer,152 the majority concluded without any analysis that the
agency's position set out in what appears to have been policy statements
153
"warrants respectful consideration."' 154 The Court engaged in no analysis of
the sort found in Mead but appears to have assumed that because no APA
process was required or followed, this was a situation that did not qualify
for Chevron deference. Again, this is not to suggest that the Court's
ultimate conclusion regarding the proper deference to afford was incorrect.
It simply illustrates the lack of interest in engaging in the sort of analysis
that Mead appears to require.
In addition to shortcutting, the Court also appears to have set aside the
Mead analysis at times. In Barnhart v. Walton,155 the Court added more
confusion by somewhat altering the Mead analysis by listing several
factors-"the interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of
the Agency, the importance of the question to administration of the statute,
the complexity of that administration, and the careful consideration the
Agency has given the question over a long period of time156-none of
which appear in the Mead case as factors to consider when determining
whether Chevron or Skidmore deference applied. If anything, all of these
"new" considerations are closer to the Skidmore factors for determining the
weight of deference to be afforded than the Mead factors for determining
whether Chevron applies. 157 Not surprisingly but further contributing to the
uncertainty in this area, several lower courts have followed this analysis
rather than the one established in Mead.1 58
Finally, perhaps because of the complications and thus excessive cost (as
Professor Vermeule described it) of the initial Mead inquiry, there are cases
in which courts refuse to decide whether they are affording the agency
however, were adopted without notice and comment rulemaking and without a formal
adjudication, and accordingly, lack the force of law."); Wilderness Watch v. Mainella, 375
F.3d 1085, 1091 n.7 (11 th Cir. 2004) ("We note, however, that when, as here, the agency
interpretation does not constitute the exercise of its formal rule-making authority, we accord
the agency consideration based upon the factors cited in Skidmore .. "); Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A. v. FDIC, 310 F.3d 202, 208 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ("[W]e doubt whether the FDIC is
entitled to Chevron deference because, although it had issued the Rankin Letter at the time
Wells Fargo acquired the three Oakar banks, it had not yet exercised its formal rulemaking
authority .... ).
152. 534 U.S. 473 (2002).
153. See id. at 484-85.
154. Id. at 497.
155. 535 U.S. 212 (2002).
156. Id. at 222.
157. See Merrill & Watts, supra note 68, at 576 n.615.
158. See, e.g., Kruse v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., 383 F.3d 49, 59-61 (2d Cir.
2004) (following Barnhart factors rather than Mead factors to conclude that Chevron
deference should be afforded); In re New Times Sec. Servs., Inc., 371 F.3d 68, 81-82 (2d
Cir. 2004) (noting a lack of formal procedures and then evaluating several factors that look
more like Skidmore considerations but never commenting on uniformity or precedential
effect); Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Thompson, 389 F.3d 1272, 1279-80 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citing and
applying Barnhart).
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position Chevron or Skidmore deference. These courts simply conclude
that the issue is not outcome determinative and therefore they need not
engage in the analysis. 159
2. How Much Deference Is Afforded Under Skidmore?
As to the second type of uncertainty-a lack of clarity as a result of a
sliding scale of deference-it is hard to measure whether the courts have
been getting this "right" or "wrong" since it is a multifactor, totality of the
circumstances test. We can, however, make a few observations.
Like standards of review, varying degrees of deference can often be
difficult to sort out.16 0 But Skidmore deference is unique in that it does not
dictate a set amount of deference: Instead, "agency interpretations receive
various degrees of deference, ranging from none, to slight, to great,
depending on the court's assessment of the strength of the agency
interpretation under consideration."' 161  Although Justice Souter takes
Justice Scalia to task for his efforts to "limit and simplify"'162 one wonders
whether it is possible to sort the varying degrees of deference Skidmore
imagines. Would this be a spectrum of something like "no" deference, "a
little" deference, "some" deference, "a good deal" of deference, and finally,
"a lot" of deference? And how would each of these ultimately play out in
terms of interpreting an ambiguous statute? That is, can we say that when
we just give something "a little" deference, it ought not carry the day but
that when we afford "a good deal of deference," it should? And does that
mean "some" deference might go either way so it is effectively useless in
the analysis?
159. See, e.g., NRDC v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 421 F.3d 872, 878-89 (9th Cir.
2005) ("We need not resolve this question here, because even under the Chevron standard of
review, the 2002 quota was based on an impermissible construction of the Act. We therefore
will assume that Chevron review is appropriate."); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Wilson N.
Jones Mem'l. Hosp., 374 F.3d 362, 369 (5th Cir. 2004) ("We do not need to decide whether
the [Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.'s ("PBGC's")] interpretation of annuity starting date
warrants Chevron deference because it is clear that the PBGC's order may be upheld as a
matter of law under the less deferential standard set forth in [Mead]."); Cmty. Health Ctr. v.
Wilson-Coker, 311 F.3d 132, 138 (2d Cir. 2002) ("We therefore accord [the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services'] interpretation considerable deference, whether under
Chevron or otherwise."); cf United States v. Atandi, 376 F.3d 1186, 1189 (10th Cir. 2004)
("Without determining whether full Chevron deference is owed to this ATF interpretation of
§ 922(g)(5)(A) in light of the criminal nature of that statute, we unquestionably owe 'some
deference' to the ATF's regulation." (citation omitted)). It should be noted that although the
Fifth Circuit in Pension Benefit refused to engage in the analysis, it did at least list the three
factors to be considered when making the determination as to whether Chevron or Skidmore
applies. See Pension Benefit, 374 F.3d at 369.
160. See Vermeule, supra note 124, at 356 (citing "constitutional standards of review that
even academic experts find it nigh impossible to differentiate").
161. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 833,
855 (2001).
162. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 236 (2001).
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Faced with this uncertainty, courts have simply decided not to engage in
the analysis where they would reach the same conclusion as the agency.
For example, in FTC v. Garvey,163 the court
decline[d] to decide to what degree of deference the Guides may be
entitled or whether the Guides can form an independent basis for
spokesperson liability. Such a determination is not necessary to the
resolution of this case. Even if the Guides had the full force of law, we
would find that Garvey is not liable under them. 164
Alternatively, courts have decided to afford some amount of deference
but have found it unnecessary to delineate exactly how much deference to
be afforded or explain why. The best example of this is found in
Community Health Center v. Wilson-Coker,165 in which the Second Circuit
wryly concluded that it "owe[d] some significant measure of deference"' 166
to the agency's position but it did not need to "decide the exact molecular
weight of the deference' 167 it would accord. Indeed, the court stated that it
would afford the agency position what it called "considerable deference,
whether under Chevron or otherwise."' 168
Finally, in this same vein, there is the simple answer of "we defer."
There are no nuances, no varying degrees, no varying weights. These
courts simply conclude at the end of the analysis that they will defer.169 For
example, in Vernazza v. SEC,170 the court's Skidmore analysis was summed
up in a single sentence providing no weight or nuance to the deference that
was afforded: "In this case, we defer to the Commission's experience and
163. 383 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2004).
164. Id. at 903-04 (footnote omitted); see also Dabit v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 395 F.3d 25, 34 n.6 (2d Cir. 2005) ("Because ... we would independently reach
the same conclusion as the SEC on the applicability of § 10(b) jurisprudence to the meaning
of [the statute's] 'in connection with' requirement, we need not engage in exhaustive
analysis of these factors." (citation omitted)). One might argue that in Dabit, the court
simply performed a Chevron step one analysis, that is, it found the statute unambiguous and
that is the end of the matter. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). The courts tend not to frame their analyses in these terms,
however. See Dabit, 395 F.3d at 34 n.6 (discussing factors considered in Skidmore analysis).
165. 311 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2002).
166. Id. at 137.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 138.
169. See, e.g., Santiago v. GMAC Mortgage Group, Inc., 417 F.3d 384, 389 (3d Cir.
2005); Beck v. City of Cleveland, 390 F.3d 912, 920 (6th Cir. 2004); Ammex, Inc. v. United
States, 367 F.3d 530, 535 (6th Cir. 2004); Brown v. United States, 327 F.3d 1198, 1206
(D.C. Cir. 2003); Chao v. Russell P. Le Frois Builder, Inc., 291 F.3d 219, 228 (2d Cir.
2002); cf Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Wilson N. Jones Mem'l Hosp., 374 F.3d 362, 370
(5th Cir. 2004) ("Consequently, we find the PBGC order.., to be very persuasive, entitled
to significant respect, and should be upheld."). In this vein, one might be tempted to fault a
court for a decision that concludes simply that the court will not defer. A conclusion of no
deference, however, is consistent with Skidmore's sliding scale so long as all of the factors
have been considered. See De La Mota v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 412 F.3d 71, 80-82 (2d Cir.
2005) (concluding that there was no basis for deference after finding that none of the
Skidmore factors were satisfied to any extent).
170. 327 F.3d 851 (9th Cir. 2003).
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expertise in determining that investment advisers are knowledgeable
enough to recognize that an arrangement such as the [Shareholder Servicing
Agreement] creates potential conflicts of interest."1 71
In addition to giving up on or shortcutting the analysis in various ways,
when courts do employ the Skidmore test, the consequence appears to be
that the courts defer to agency action less often. Based on his analysis of
federal cases decided in the six months after Mead was handed down, Eric
Womack concluded that the view of the agency was unlikely to prevail
where Skidmore deference was afforded:
Of the twenty-nine cases citing Skidmore in the context of the Mead test,
only nine (around thirty-one percent) upheld the agency's opinion. Of
these nine cases, four affirmed the agency's decision in what can only be
described as a coincidence that favored the agency, as the court applied
essentially de novo review in each case. Thus, the number of courts that
granted meaningful deference to the agency's decision fell to five (around
seventeen percent). 172
Whether these results are "correct" is difficult to assess. The critical
question, however, is whether the Court intended this sort of skewing
against the agency as the result of Mead. Indeed, this becomes all the more
acute when one considers that in the pre-Christensen cases when Skidmore
deference was afforded, courts agreed with the agency in seventy-five
percent of the cases, 173 as opposed to finding such agreement in (at most)
thirty-one percent of the early post-Mead cases.
Recent cases from the courts of appeals confirm that although more
decisions continue to be decided against agencies than for them when
Skidmore applies, the trend is not as pronounced as in Womack's initial
analysis. Of the federal appeals court cases citing Skidmore since
Womack's work, many did not provide anything beyond a passing
reference to Skidmore and Mead (they engaged in the shortcutting described
above), and accordingly their holdings did not turn on affording a particular
level of deference1 74 or even on whether any deference whatsoever was
171. Id. at 860.
172. Eric Womack, Into the Third Era of Administrative Law: An Empirical Study of the
Supreme Court's Retreat from Chevron Principles in United States v. Mead, 107 Dick. L.
Rev. 289, 327-28 (2002) (footnotes omitted).
173. See id. at 327.
174, See, e.g., Vigil v. Leavitt, 381 F.3d 826, 835 (9th Cir. 2004) ("We need not resolve
the question whether the [agency's] interpretation of the Act ... is entitled to Chevron
deference, because the result in the present case would be the same under any standard of
deference."); Bonneville Int'l Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485, 490 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining
that the court need not decide whether Chevron or Skidmore applies because "whichever
standard of deference is accorded, we agree with the [agency]"); id. at 490 n.9 (indicating
that judges on the panel disagreed as to whether Chevron or Skidmore applied). I also
include in this group those cases in which the court refers to any level of Skidmore deference
as being sufficient since these cases also indicate that the amount of deference is not
determinative. See, e.g., Scafar Contracting, Inc. v. Sec'y of Labor, 325 F.3d 422, 428 (3d
Cir. 2003) ("We conclude that the [agency's] position.., provides a sound and consistent
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afforded. 175 But where a court engaged in something more than a cursory
analysis of the appropriate level of deference, sixty-one percent of the
courts sided against the agency, 176 which meant that thirty-nine percent
sided with the agency.' 7
7
Again, without commenting on the correctness of the court's decision,
Coke v. Long Island Care At Home, Ltd.178 provides a striking illustration
of the skewing tendency. In that case, the Second Circuit's analysis under
Skidmore rather than Chevron led the Second Circuit to refuse to defer to a
regulation, even though other courts had deferred to the regulation
previously under Chevron.179 In sum, it appears that the skewing suggested
by Womack continues, although it may not be as pronounced as in the early
cases.
III. WHAT WOULD JUSTICE STEVENS DO?: A PROPOSAL
As I have discussed above, this area of administrative law appears to be
in a state of disarray. The students who must take administrative law and
the litigators who must figure out how to advise their clients and argue their
cases face significant challenges. There appears to be, as Justice Scalia
predicted, more confusion and uncertainty than necessary. Drawing on the
image I began with, this structure is in need of another strong pillar.
approach for interpreting the [act], irrespective of whatever level of Skidmore deference may
be appropriate.").
175. See, e.g., In re New Times Sec. Servs, Inc., 371 F.3d 68, 87 (2d Cir. 2004) ("[E]ven
if we were not to adopt the [agency's] interpretation as a matter of Skidmore deference, we
would independently conclude that it is the proper interpretation of the statute."); Bullcreek
v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 359 F.3d 536, 541 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ("[T]he result is the
same whether the court applies de novo review, deference under [Skidmore], or Chevron
deference.").
176. See Orlando Food Corp. v. United States, 423 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Packard v.
Pittsburgh Transp. Co., 418 F.3d 246 (3d Cir. 2005); Lin v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 416 F.3d
184 (2d Cir. 2005); De La Mota v. U.S. Dept. of Educ., 412 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2005); Warner-
Lambert Co. v. United States, 407 F.3d 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Coke v. Long Island Care At
Home, Ltd., 376 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2004); George Harms Constr. Co. v. Chao, 371 F.3d 156
(3d Cir. 2004); Structural Indus., Inc. v. United States, 356 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2004);
Malacara v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 2003); Butterbaugh v. Dep't of Justice, 336 F.3d
1332 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Ebbert v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 319 F.3d 103 (3d Cir. 2003); Moore
v. Hannon Food Serv., Inc., 317 F.3d 489 (5th Cir. 2003); Tax & Accounting Software Corp.
v. United States, 301 F.3d 1254 (10th Cir. 2002); Mead Corp. v. United States, 283 F.3d
1342 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
177. See Santiago v. GMAC Mortgage Group, Inc., 417 F.3d 384 (3d Cir. 2005);
Cathedral Candle Co. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 400 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2005);
Aeroquip-Vickers, Inc. v. C.I.R., 347 F.3d 173 (6th Cir. 2003); Rubie's Costume Co. v.
United States, 337 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Cal. State Legislative Bd. v. Mineta, 328 F.3d
605 (9th Cir. 2003); Brown v. United States, 327 F.3d 1198 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Omohundro v.
United States, 300 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2002); Jewelpak Corp. v. United States, 297 F.3d
1326 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Chao v. Russell P. Le Frois Builder, Inc., 291 F.3d 219 (2d Cir.
2002).
178. 376 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2004).
179. Id. at 135.
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Although Justice Stevens has never shied away from writing separately,
he has not authored any of the majority opinions in this area and thus has
never crafted the test. And this has been, in my view, our loss. I think we
are in need of Justice Stevens's pragmatic and steadying hand. So I have
imagined, based largely on his clear and sensible Chevron test as well as his
other separate opinions, how Justice Stevens might better articulate-and
refine in the process-the Mead test were he to write the next majority
opinion on the issue. I have done so in seven steps-which is admittedly
not as catchy as the Chevron two-step1 80-but, I hope, has retained the
same feel as the original approach since it employs the Justice's language.
Before turning to the test that I have imagined Justice Stevens crafting,
let me briefly address why I have not suggested changing some portions of
the test as they exist today. First and foremost, I should note that I
attempted to avoid dramatically changing the Mead test because Justice
Stevens joined the Court's Mead opinion. In other words, because he has
already indicated his support for that general approach, I think it unlikely
that he would change directions altogether. Instead, I imagine that he
would be more receptive to sensible, smaller modifications to the test that
are in the same vein as the original decision. I have therefore attempted to
limit the revised test to those circumstances.
But this does not entirely account for why I have not suggested sweeping
changes. I have selected a more modest approach largely because I agree in
the main with much of the Mead opinion, assuming that my reading of
Justice Souter's opinion is correct. In addition, many of the proposals to
modify Mead seem to be more unwieldy and unsound than Mead and thus
would not be an improvement over what is currently in place. Indeed, in
most instances, the biggest problem with Mead is discerning what is
required rather than disputing the merits of those requirements.
Let me comment, however, on some of the alternative proposals. I will
begin with proposals to create a different test to determine when Chevron
applies. 181
180. Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2702
(2005).
181. There are also those who have suggested that the Court "has lost its way on the
deference issue, and needs to rethink this area of the law," from its inconsistent applications
of Chevron to its decision in Mead. See, e.g., Russell L. Weaver, The Emperor Has No
Clothes: Christensen, Mead and Dual Deference Standards, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 173, 175
(2002) [hereinafter Weaver, The Emperor]. Although he seems to like the idea of
abandoning Chevron and Mead and starting over altogether, Professor Weaver nonetheless
suggests that "one might . . . argue that dual approaches [found in Chevron and Mead]
produce an important benefit because they establish 'mood points' which give courts an
attitudinal perspective on their work." Id. at 179. But he notes that even if the Court wanted
to employ his "mood point" suggestion, it would have to design a system in which courts
still retained their "constitutionally required . . . 'checking role' designed to prevent
administrative abuse." Id. at 180. Professor Weaver did not propose such a system in his
2002 piece, see id. at 181, but in a later article he argued for an amendment to the
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") that would apply a single level of deference to all
administrative interpretations but would retain a "checking" function for the courts. See
Russell L. Weaver, An APA Provision on Nonlegislative Rules?, 56 Admin. L. Rev. 1179
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One such proposal offered by Professors David Barron and Elena Kagan
would afford Chevron deference where "the official Congress named in the
relevant delegation ... personally assumed responsibility for the decision
prior to issuance."18 2 Professor Vermeule criticizes this proposal on several
grounds 183 but his most important critique appears to be that it creates an
incentive for lower agency officials to make decisions that an agency head
then "rubberstamp[s]"'1 84 in order to get Chevron deference, that is,
circumventing the requirement of personal responsibility for the larger
benefit afforded by triggering Chevron deference. 185 Professors Barron and
Kagan claim that political and institutional pressure will be sufficient to
deter an agency head from this sort of circumvention. 18 6 But, as Professor
Vermeule points out,
[t]he authors have avoided the enforceability problem only by
undermining the significance of their own proposal. If... the value of
obtaining Chevron deference is large enough to provoke agency
circumvention of the Chevron nondelegation doctrine, then the proposal
will require just as costly and unmanageable a judicial inquiry as the
excessively refined Mead inquiry it is designed to replace.187
In other words, one suspects that even though there are significant
institutional and political pressures on an agency head, Chevron deference
may be enticing enough to elicit bad behavior.
Expecting this criticism, Professors Barron and Kagan argue that even if
they have underestimated "cheating" of the sort described above, there is a
relatively simple solution to this new problem: They would permit courts
to "preclud[e] Chevron deference on a finding that a delegatee consistently
has approved low-level decisions without providing for their review." 188
But this review is limited to those circumstances in which there has been
"wholesale evasion"'189 and would require courts to decline "to explore the
review that a delegatee has accorded to any particular interpretive
decision." 190
(2004) [hereinafter Weaver, An APA Provision]. Although it appears unnecessary to amend
the APA to accomplish Professor Weaver's goals-that is, the Court could overturn its prior
precedent and simply adopt Professor Weaver's new test-it is likely that Professor Weaver
has suggested an amendment because of the difficulty in convincing the Court to entirely
uproot and start over in this area. I therefore consider this proposal, like others seeking to
entirely rewrite this area of law, better suited for Congress to take up and thus beyond the
scope of this Article.
182. David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 201, 235 (2001).
183. See Vermeule, supra note 124, at 359-60.
184. Barron & Kagan, supra note 182, at 253.
185. See Vermeule, supra note 124, at 360.
186. See Barron & Kagan, supra note 182, at 253-55.
187. Vermeule, supra note 124, at 360.
188. Barron & Kagan, supra note 182, at 255.
189. Id. at 256.
190. Id.
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While it is true that this solution would not require much in terms of a
court's resources191 -because it sets the bar very high, one imagines a court
will only be called to investigate the most obvious of cases-it also suffers
from its simplicity. That is, it would require an agency head to act with
only a bit of savvy to create what appears to be more review in order to
avoid a finding of misbehavior under the test suggested by Professors
Barron and Kagan. For example, they suggest that one way to demonstrate
that an agency head is acting inappropriately under their test is to provide
"evidence that a statutory delegatee had signed hundreds of opinion letters
on many matters within a short period of time." 192 But this is quite easy to
overcome: An agency head could spend no more time on each letter but
simply sign only a certain number each day. In short, because there does
not appear to be an adequate and easily enforceable means of restraining the
circumvention that would likely result from this proposal, it appears unwise
to adopt it.
Justice Scalia's proposed test for determining whether an agency's
position is "authoritative" and thus should be afforded Chevron deference
includes considerations that are similar to those proposed by Professors
Barron and Kagan, such as whether an agency decision has been endorsed
at the highest levels. 193 It therefore appears to suffer from the same flaw as
the Barron and Kagan test, that is, it could be easily manipulated by an
agency head to suit her purposes. This is perhaps more so with Justice
Scalia's test since he would allow confirmation from the agency during
litigation-after the dispute has arisen when there are undoubtedly
advantages to the agency if it is afforded Chevron deference-that the
determination reflects the agency's authoritative view. 194
Another popular proposal is to afford Chevron deference when the
agency determination is the result of a required APA process such as
notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication. 195 This proposal
has all the benefits of a rule: 196 It is easy to apply and leaves little room for
discretion. But it would leave out a whole category of agency
determinations that Congress intended would have binding effect even
though it did not require any APA process. 197 And while they may disagree
as to where the line should be drawn when it comes to what decisions
191. See id.
192. Id. at 256 n.186.
193. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 258 & n.6, 259 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
194. See id.
195. See Vermeule, supra note 124, at 360 (citing Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules,
Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals and the Like-Should Federal Agencies Use Them
to Bind the Public, 41 Duke L.J. 1311 (1992)).
196. Merrill, supra note 70, at 819-20.
197. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 231 (citing NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity
Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 256-57 (1995)).
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should be afforded Chevron deference, more than a majority of the Court is
unwilling to leave out this category entirely. 198
A similar proposal has been offered by Professor Ronald Krotoszynski,
Jr., who has cogently argued that "[w]hether Chevron deference applies in a
given case should not turn on the legal fiction of an implied delegation of
lawmaking power but rather on whether the materials at issue reflect and
incorporate agency expertise." 199 As such, in his view,
[i]f an administrative agency resolves a statutory ambiguity, whether
through an adjudication, a rulemaking, or a policy statement, the relevant
question to be asked and answered is whether the agency possesses
relevant expertise over the subject matter and whether, on the record, the
agency actually brought that expertise to bear in creating the work product
in question.200
While this test certainly has its benefits, it appears at bottom to collapse
into the same test offered by those who would afford deference based solely
on the process involved in the agency's determination. That is, Professor
Krotoszynski argues that "an agency's decision should receive a level of
judicial deference that is more or less proportionate to the degree of
confidence that the reviewing court has in the procedure associated with the
agency reaching its decision."20 ' As an example of the higher end of this
deference, he suggests that "[w]hen an agency relies upon a procedure that
is virtually certain to result in a sound decision (e.g., formal rulemaking or
adjudication), a court should invalidate the agency action only when it is
demonstrably inconsistent with the expressly declared intent of
Congress." 20 2  On the other hand, "[w]hen an agency does not utilize
procedures likely to ensure a rational decision, a reviewing court must take
a closer look at the agency's decision and the reasons that support it."'20 3
Like the example above, however, while Krotoszynski's test might be
easier to apply (and perhaps offer a bit more nuance than just relying on
process as the measure), it would not appear to allow for affording greater
deference in those instances in which APA process is not required even if
Congress intended the agency action to be binding. As discussed above,
198. See id.; id. at 257 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Although two new Justices recently joined
the Court, a shift in the majority view on this issue is unlikely even if these two new
members disagree with the rest of the Court.
199. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?: Implied Delegations, Agency
Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 735, 737 (2002).
200. Id. at 738; cf John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to
Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 612, 681 (1996) (arguing that
"the Court should modify Seminole Rock by embracing the approach of Skidmore v. Swift &
Co., which adopts a standard of review that accounts for agency expertise and experience
when Congress has not delegated interpretive lawmaking authority under statutes" (footnote
omitted)).
201. Krotoszynski, supra note 199, at 754.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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this is a proposition that, to this point, no Justice has been willing to
accept. 204
Professors Merrill and Watts have advocated adopting a test under which
an agency's determination will be afforded Chevron deference if "Congress
has included a provision in the statute that prescribes sanctions or other
legal consequences for violations of agency action."20 5  Although this
suggestion is adopted in part below, the under-inclusiveness 20 6 of their test
is troubling, making it an unlikely candidate for wholesale adoption. In
particular, the Merrill and Watts test prevents National Labor Relations
Board ("NLRB") rules and orders and certain Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") rules from being afforded Chevron deference
because their organic statutes do not contain a sanctions provision,20 7
despite the formality of the process those agencies are required to
undertake20 8 as well as the intended precedential and binding nature of the
agency action.209 This can be remedied, however, by not limiting the test to
Merrill and Watts's single requirement but instead incorporating this
requirement as one element in the analysis of what agency decisions have
the force of law, as I do below. 210
With respect to the question of what deference ought to be afforded when
Skidmore applies, I begin with Justice Scalia's argument that it ought to be
204. See supra note 198.
205. Merrill, supra note 70, at 828; see also Merrill & Watts, supra note 68, at 582-83.
206. See Merrill, supra note 70, at 831.
207. See id. at 831-32; cf Merrill & Watts, supra note 68, at 557-70 (discussing the
history of these two agencies and the powers delegated to them under their organic statutes).
208. See Merrill & Watts, supra note 68, at 569-70 (discussing American Hospital Ass'n
v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 609-10 (1991), which approved the National Labor Relations
Board's use of notice-and-comment rulemaking); id. at 559 (explaining how the Court
assumed in Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609 (1973), that the
Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") has power to issue rules through notice-and-
comment rulemaking under the general rulemaking grant in the organic statute); id. at 563-
64 (discussing National Ass 'n of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers v. FDA, 637 F.2d 877, 878
(2d Cir. 1981), which involved FDA rules that had gone through the "notice-and-comment
procedures contemplated by 5 U.S.C. § 553").
209. See, e.g., Collective-Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry, 52 Fed. Reg.
25,142, 25,144-45 (July 2, 1987).
The Board is of the opinion that rulemaking, though perhaps time consuming at the
outset, will be a valuable long-term investment, paying dividends in the form of
predictability, efficiency, and more enlightened determinations as to viable
appropriate units, leading ultimately to better judicial and public acceptance ... [as
well as the] advantage of settling, finally, the difficult question of appropriate
bargaining units in the health care industry.
Id. In Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, the court quoted the proposed FDA rule as providing
that
[t]he Commissioner intends for [the] regulations to become binding specific
requirements that must be complied with; failure to do so shall render a drug product
adulterated under section 501(a)(2)(B) of the (Act) . . . . Binding regulations
will.., serve to inform courts of FDA's expert judgments regarding current good
manufacturing practice for drugs in the United States; this will expedite and assist
enforcement proceedings to assure compliance with section 501(a)(2)(B) of the act.
637 F.2d at 878.
210. See infra pp. 1908-09 (Step 3).
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Chevron deference or no deference. 2 11 This argument appears to turn on a
point I readily concede: It is often difficult to differentiate between
multiple layers or tiers of deference. 2 12 In fact, the more levels of deference
that are added, the harder it is to tell the difference between them, which
results in judges performing a time-consuming and nearly impossible task
that likely makes little difference in the outcome.2 13
I do not agree, however, that there can be nothing between Chevron
deference and no deference. That is, I think there can be an intermediate
level of deference between those two points and, more importantly, that
judges can meaningfully differentiate between them. Accordingly, my
suggestion is to eliminate the sliding scale of Skidmore deference because it
is difficult for courts to distinguish between these too-many-possible levels
of deference.2 14  I then suggest replacing -the sliding scale with an
intermediate, thumb-on-the-scale type of deference that affords the
agency's determination less than Chevron deference but more than no
respect whatsoever. 2 15
With these caveats, I turn to the new seven-step test. I note that, in the
vein of the original two-step test of Chevron, it is not necessary to work
through all of the steps of the new test when analyzing a particular agency
211. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 256 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
212. See Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 Cal.
L. Rev. 1457, 1502 (2003) ("The precise degree of deference commanded by the different
standards is somewhat ambiguous and certainly not quantifiable."); Weaver, An APA
Provision, supra note 181, at 1186 ("Quite frankly, I do not see a meaningful difference
between Chevron deference and Skidmore deference. The reality is that courts do not strictly
adhere to any deference standard."); Weaver, The Emperor, supra note 181, at 175 ("First,
dual deference standards are unrealistic. Deference standards are not precise instruments
that are rigorously applied by the courts.... [I]t is doubtful whether courts actually apply
dual standards, and whether it is useful to articulate them."); cf Dickinson v. Zurko, 527
U.S. 150, 162-63 (1999) (describing the difference between the "substantial evidence"
standard of review and the "clearly erroneous" standard as "a subtle one-so fine that (apart
from the present case) we have failed to uncover a single instance in which a reviewing court
conceded that use of one standard"); Ronald M. Levin, Mead and the Prospective Exercise
of Discretion, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 771, 782-83 (2004) ("There is ample room for debate about
whether judicial efforts to calibrate Skidmore deference, by resort to individualized
'deference factors,' tend to add helpful data to the dialogue, or, instead, to clutter it with
makeweight arguments.").
213. See Vermeule, supra note 124, at 357 (offering the critique that "adding an extra tier
of deference is, in a pragmatic sense, simply not feasible, given the cognitive constraints
under which real-world adjudication occurs. Judges can operate in a mode of deference, and
in a mode of independent decision-making, but more refined, intermediate modes are either
psychologically unattainable or nonexistent."); cf Zurko, 527 U.S. at 162-63; Vermeule,
supra note 124, at 357 (quoting Judge Posner as stating that "[judicial] endorsement of
multiple standards of review ... greatly exaggerates the utility of verbal differentiation" in
United States v. McKinney, 919 F.2d 405, 423 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring)). A
related issue is the "judicial tendency to transmogrify the rhetoric of review standards,"
regardless of what standards are involved. Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the
Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1371, 1394 (1995). Although a
detailed examination of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article, Judge Wald's argument
on this front lends support for crafting deference standards that are clear and fixed.
214. See supra text after note 162.
215. See infra pp. 1911-12 (Step 7).
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determination. Indeed, one might describe the new seven-step approach as
a "clear intent" stairway that then splits into two "deference corridors. '216
If the intent of Congress is clear, one may stop on the landing of the
stairway; she need not head down either of the deference corridors. If the
intent is not clear, however, one needs to head down the proper deference
corridor and then determine if that level of deference is appropriate in the
circumstances. So let's begin the journey:
1. "If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress. "217 There is no question of deference where
we can, "employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ",218 discern
Congress's intent.
This is Chevron's step one; it is the beginning point for every analysis of
statutory interpretation involving an agency regardless of the type of agency
action that is taken when interpreting the statute.
2. If on the other hand, the "statute is silent or ambiguous with respect
to the specific issue, "219 we must determine if the agency has provided a
construction of the statute in question. Before an agency's answer is given
any weight whatsoever, it must be clear that the agency is construing a
statute that it has the authority to administer.
This step contains the first part of Chevron's second step, which asks,
once it is determined that a statute is ambiguous, whether the agency has
construed the statute. Also at this step, it is important to be sure that the
agency is construing a "statute which it administers. '220 For example, it
does not make sense to defer to an agency interpretation of the National
Environmental Policy Act 221 unless the agency construing the statute is the
Council on Environmental Quality, the agency charged with administering
that Act.222
216. One of my colleagues has suggested that I call this new approach the "Stairway to
Hell," drawing on the famous Led Zeppelin song Stairway to Heaven. Although this might
reflect how some, including Justice Scalia, might feel about the exercise, I will continue to
call it a seven-step test.
217. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984).
218. Id. at 843 n.9.
219. Id. at 843.
220. Id. at 842.
221. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370e (2000).
222. See Kenneth A. Manaster, Justice Stevens, Judicial Power, and the Varieties of
Environmental Litigation, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 1963, 2008 n.207 (2006) (citing Andrus v.
Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979), in which the Court afforded the Council on
Environmental Quality substantial deference with respect to interpretations of the National
Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA")); cf City of N.Y. v. Minetta, 262 F.3d 169, 177 (2d
Cir. 2001).
Although the Secretary [of Transportation] is not charged with administering
NEPA, his conclusion that an [environmental impact statement] was not required
was based not on his interpretation of NEPA but, rather, on his construction of [a
different law], which he is charged with administering. We must, therefore, if
necessary, apply Chevron deference to his decision.
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In this vein, one might also ask whether there are any circumstances
under which an agency's construction of a statute that it administers would
not be afforded any deference because of something unique about the issue
raised. For example, if the issue involves the reach of the agency's
jurisdiction,223 if the question is whether a statutory deadline applies to an
agency,224 or if the agency has a pecuniary stake in the matter,225 it could
be argued that the agency's interpretation should not be given any weight or
deference because the agency is self-interested in the question posed.
Although a few Justices have sided with these concerns, 226 there has never
been a majority opinion embracing such a limit.
One novel way of dealing with these issues can be found in Food and
Drug Administration v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,227 in which
the Court concluded at step one of Chevron that Congress did not intend for
the FDA to regulate tobacco products under its organic statute, the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetics Act.228 One reading of the Court's opinion is that
whether an agency is entitled to Chevron deference turns ultimately on
congressional intent. With respect to "ordinary" gaps in a statutory
scheme, Chevron represents a presumption that Congress intends the
agency to be primary interpreter. It does not follow, however, that
Congress harbors the same intent with respect to "extraordinary" gaps that
implicate the scope of an agency's authority. . . . [E]xtraordinary
questions are those as to which one can say, based on the totality of the
statutory circumstances, that Congress clearly would not want the courts
to give mandatory deference to agency interpretations of law.
2 2 9
Id. The Supreme Court has also refused to afford deference to an agency's interpretation of
the APA because it "is not a statute that the [agency] is charged with administering." Metro.
Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 137 n.9 (1997).
223. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 161, at 909-14; see also Miss. Power & Light
Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 386-87 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting,
joined by Marshall, J., and Blackmun, J.) (concluding that Chevron deference was
inappropriate because "[a]gencies do not 'administer' statutes confining the scope of their
jurisdiction, and such statutes are not 'entrusted' to agencies"); Stephen G. Breyer et al.,
Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy: Problems, Text, and Cases 319 (2002) (citing
the lower court division on this issue).
224. Breyer et al., supra note 223, at 319.
225. Cf Meadow Green-Wildcat Corp. v. Hathaway, 936 F.2d 601, 604-05 (1st Cir.
1991) (Breyer, J.) (concluding that deference to the agency's interpretation of an agreement
provision was inappropriate because, among other things, the agency stood to benefit
financially if the fee provision was interpreted in its favor).
226. See supra notes 223 and 225, although it should be noted that Justice Breyer has not
repeated his concern motivating Meadow Green-Wildcat as a Justice.
227. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
228. 21 U.S.C §§ 301- 399 (2000).
229. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 161, at 912-13; see also Solid Waste Agency of N.
Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172-73 (2001) ("Where
an administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer limits of Congress' power, we
expect a clear indication that Congress intended that result. This requirement stems from our
prudential desire not to needlessly reach constitutional issues and our assumption that
Congress does not casually authorize administrative agencies to interpret a statute to push
the limit of congressional authority." (citation omitted)).
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That is, instead of specifically concluding that there is ambiguity in the
statute, the Court concludes that this is not the sort of provision Congress
intended the agency to interpret and will therefore interpret the statute using
the normal tools of statutory construction. Although one solution "would
be to ask at 'step zero' whether Congress would want the particular
question about the scope of agency authority to be resolved as a matter of
mandatory deference (Chevron) or common-law deference (Skidmore),"230
it appears to be more consistent with the Court's current approach to place
the inquiry at this juncture. Moreover, one need not worry about
determining the "extraordinariness" of the statutory question posed if the
statute is found at step one to be unambiguous. Accordingly, it would be
appropriate to defer this question until this point in the analysis, when one
is certain that it needs to be resolved.
3. If the agency's determination is the result of a required APA
process, the agency's answer will be evaluated under the Chevron
deference standard so long as Congress has not clearly indicated that the
agency is acting without the force of law. Congress will be considered to
have "clearly indicated that the agency is acting without the force of law"
if Congress provides that the agency "does not act with the force of law"
when making its determination. It will also be sufficient to demonstrate that
it does not intend an agency to act with the force of law if (1) Congress
indicates that the agency's determination is neither binding nor
precedential and (2) Congress fails to provide in the statute "that persons
who violate an agency's rules or orders will be subject to the imposition of
sanctions, disabilities, or other adverse consequences. "231
This prong is like Mead in that it establishes a presumption of Chevron
deference when an APA process is required by the statute and followed by
the agency in reaching its decision.232 It then allows for Congress to decide
that required APA process is not enough by indicating explicitly that the
agency's determination still "lacks the force of law." Congress may also
indicate that the agency's determination lacks the force of law implicitly by
establishing a statutory scheme (1) that fails to give this type of agency
determination binding and precedential effect with respect to other cases
(the two factors other than formality of procedures found in Mead), and (2)
that, drawing on the work of Professors Merrill and Watts,233 provides no
penalty for violating the agency's determination.
As mentioned before, including agency determinations that the agency
intends to be binding and precedential in the category of agency actions that
have the force of law resolves the under-inclusiveness of the Merrill and
230. Id. at 912.
231. Merrill, supra note 70, at 828.
232. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) ("[A] very good
indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment is express congressional authorizations to
engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudications that produces regulations or rulings for
which deference is claimed.").
233. See Merrill, supra note 70, at 828-33.
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Watts test.234 Under the Merrill and Watts test, both the NLRB and the
FDA are agencies that are without the ability to act with the force of law in
certain circumstances because their statutes "include no provision for
sanctions or other adverse consequences for ... violations." 235 Professor
Merrill suggests solving this, if it needs solving, through congressional
action.236 Under my proposal, however, both agencies would be considered
to act with the force of law without congressional action if the rules or
orders are adopted using the required APA process (typically notice-and-
comment rulemaking or formal adjudication) and are intended to be given
binding and precedential effect.237 This means that these actions will be
assessed under the Chevron deference standard, which is more consistent
with past opinions in these areas.
4. If the agency's determination is not the result of APA-required
process, the agency's determination will be evaluated under the Skidmore
deference unless it can be shown that Congress intended that the agency's
determination would have the force of law. Congress can demonstrate this
by explicitly indicating that the determination "has the force of law, " or by
indicating that this type of determination has binding, precedential effect
and that all similar cases like the one before the agency will be treated
alike, or by indicating that a violation of the agency's determination will
subject the violator to sanctions, disabilities, or other adverse
consequences.
Like step three, this step creates a presumption when an APA process is
not required that Skidmore deference is appropriate. I retain Skidmore
deference (which we will soon see that I have simplified) for this category
of agency determinations, because regulated parties have an interest in
some stability as to what to expect from regulators.
Additionally, there are three options available to Congress to indicate that
it intends for a determination that is not required to go through an APA
process to nevertheless have the force of law. These are the same as those
included in the prior step and they are included here for the same reasons
they were included above.
5. When the Chevron deference standard applies, "the question for the
court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction
of the statute, "238 not whether it is the interpretation that the court would
have arrived at or would have preferred. If the agency's answer is
reasonable, it shall be upheld.
This is Chevron's original second step and is not intended to alter Justice
Stevens's original formulation.
6. When the Skidmore deference standard applies, the court will
evaluate "the thoroughness evident in [the agency's] consideration, the
234. See id. at 831-32; see also supra notes 206-09 and accompanying text.
235. Merrill, supra note 70, at 831.
236. See id. at 832.
237. See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
238. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
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validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if
lacking power to control. "239 When evaluating these factors, the court
should consider them in terms of (1) whether the agency determination
"reflect[s] and incorporate[s] agency expertise-24 0 and (2) whether the
decision is one that we can have confidence in to endure.
To the familiar Skidmore factors, I add that the analysis of these factors
should be guided by two background inquiries: whether the agency has
specific expertise on an issue and whether its decision reflects that
expertise, and whether the process involved in making the decision ensures
that the agency's decision will endure. I will begin with agency expertise.
As I explained before, although I think it is unlikely that the Court will
adopt Professor Krotoszynski's test for when to afford Chevron deference,
his arguments regarding agency expertise are particularly persuasive when
incorporated into the Skidmore determination as to whether to afford an
agency deference under that standard. Indeed, Skidmore itself refers to the
''more specialized experience and broader investigations and
information" 24 1 of an agency, thus recognizing that agency expertise was an
important part of the Court's calculation in that case. Likewise, in Mead
the Court referred to the fact that the Customs Service "can bring the
benefit of specialized experience to bear" on the question when suggesting
that Skidmore deference might be appropriate in that case. 242 Accordingly,
when considering the Skidmore factors-particularly when it comes to
evaluating the validity of the agency's reasoning as well as those other
factors with the power to persuade-courts should focus on the agency's
expertise and whether the agency's decision in fact reflects that expertise.
This, however, cannot be the only consideration because an agency might
act based on its expertise but nevertheless fail to be consistent and/or
thorough in its decision. It is therefore important to determine if the agency
intended its decision to last for some time rather than as a temporary
response to a particular situation, such as a calculation on the back of an
envelope. In order to gauge the sticking or staying power of an agency
determination, I suggest that courts consider the process, or lack thereof,
engaged in by the agency to reach a decision when analyzing the Skidmore
factors.
In one sense, process is an obvious way to think about the Skidmore
factors since two of them-the thoroughness of the agency's
consideration 24 3  and the consistency with earlier and later
239. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
240. Krotoszynski, supra note 199, at 737.
241. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139.
242. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 235 (2001).
243. Professor Weaver has forcefully argued against the consistency requirement and
would rely on retroactivity to curb any harsh effects from agency changes in position. See
Weaver, An APA Provision, supra note 181, at 1191-93. While this is an interesting
potential revision to the current test, because my revised standard of deference does not slide
and thus this factor could not, standing alone, result in lesser deference, I think it remains a
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pronouncements-are themselves process considerations. That is,
consistency speaks not to the substance of the determination but rather it
requires us to examine whether like cases are treated alike. Likewise, while
thoroughness could no doubt include some substantive issues, it also
includes an examination of factors such as how many parties participated in
the decision-making process (single staff member decision versus many
levels of review in the agency, including the agency head),244 how many
issues were raised and addressed,245 and, perhaps most fundamentally, how
much time and effort was spent in reaching the decision.246
This does not mean that process is a determinative factor in the Skidmore
deference analysis, just as process is not determinative in the analysis of
whether to apply Chevron or Skidmore. But it also does not mean that
process should have no impact on the analysis. Indeed, the process by
which an agency decision is made can provide valuable insight as to the
sticking power of the decision, an important consideration when analyzing
the Skidmore factors. 247
7. If the court concludes after its analysis of the Skidmore factors that
the agency's determination warrants deference, the agency's determination
should merit the court's respect.248 That is, the agency's determination
should be afforded a set or defined amount of deference that amounts to
some weight but that can be overcome by other factors. This is not the
same as the Chevron standard, which requires the court to defer so long as
the agency's interpretation is reasonable. Instead, the court may, after
according the agency 's determination its respect, decide against the agency
even if the agency's position is reasonable because the factors arguing
against it are significant and outweigh the agency's position.
In order to reduce confusion and uncertainty, this final step opts for a
defined amount of deference-the agency's position merits respect-when
it is shown, based on an analysis of the Skidmore factors, that the agency's
position has the court's confidence. This new deference is not weighted in
favor of the agency as heavily as Chevron deference, but it nevertheless
proper consideration in the analysis. Indeed, I could see in the scenario Professor Weaver
imagines that if an agency provides a reasoned explanation for the change in position, the
lack of consistency might well be "trumped" by the persuasiveness of the agency's current
position as well as the reasoning employed by the agency that inspired the change.
244. See, e.g., De La Mota v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 412 F.3d 71, 80 (2d Cir. 2005)
("Thorough consideration requires a macro perspective that a staff member, acting alone,
lacks.").
245. See, e.g., Rubie's Costume Co. v. United States, 337 F.3d 1350, 1356 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (concluding that there was thorough consideration under Skidmore where, among
other things, the agency considered "767 comments [that] were received in response to the
notice").
246. See, e.g., id. (noting that notice-and-comment procedures were employed and that
denial was not issued until after comments were received).
247. Cf Krotoszynski, supra note 199, at 754 ("[A]n agency's decision should receive a
level of judicial deference that is more or less proportionate to the degree of confidence that
the reviewing court has in the procedure associated with the agency reaching its decision.").
248. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 595 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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gives the agency's interpretation some influence in the analysis. In simplest
terms, it is a thumb on the scale for the agency but it does not go so far as to
amount to a presumption in the agency's favor.
This more defined standard of deference should not only reduce
confusion and pre-decision costs, it should also create a more predictable
and thus more "correct" sort of skewing against the agency.249 That is,
even if this new deference standard results in less agreement with the
agency when compared to instances in which a court affords Chevron
deference (because in fact it is a lesser amount of deference that is afforded
under this new Skidmore deference), that result will be intended by the
Court, not just an inadvertent consequence of applying Skidmore deference
as appears to be the case now.
CONCLUSION
While I have tried to imagine the sensible approach Justice Stevens might
adopt with my seven-step test, I suspect that, if given the opportunity, the
Justice would provide us with a better test than anything I am able to
conjure up. And he would do so, no doubt, in much less time and far more
eloquently. I simply hope this effort might provide a useful place to start.
249. See supra notes 172-77 and accompanying text.
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